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NEW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE CHALLENGES OF THE ECOLOGICAL AGE
Richard A. Falk
I am glad to have this opportunity to
talk about the future of international
law, although I am mindful of the
difficulty of dealing adequately with
this subject within the limits of availahle
time. The most I can hope to do here is
to outline the general way in which I see
the picture and hopr, you will trust that
evidence and reasoning exists to support
the conclusions. One of the things ahout
the future, which is important to apprr,ciate is that ideological differences exist
he tween different political systems at
the present time, particularly the difference between the Communist and the
Iiberal·demoeratic political systems.
This difference wiII, in my judgment,
have a diminishing effect on the deve"Iopment of international law. I feel this
is true not only brcause ideological
perceptions of the world and of national
interests seem to me to be of declining

importance in the principal states of the
world, but more f undamentlllly hrcam;l~
all nations are going to hc facllo increasingly with a common seL of functional prohlems which will indlJl:ll them
to grasp the central role of coopllration
in working out common responses to
these problems.
Even today differences in social,
economic, technological, and geographical position seem much more important
than diffl'renccs in idrology in thll
i Jl ternational system. Disagreements
about legal doctrine between thc
poorer, developing countries and the
rich, developed countries are likely to
become very much more prominent in
the years immediately ahead. These
disagreements are likely to assume a
variety of forms. The poorer countries
will seek to limit the economic advan·
tages that might accrue to the richer
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countries from unencumbered exploitation of their technological advantages.
One finds this already in relation to
current discussions over how the
mineral wealth of the oceans shall be
trrated fmm a legal point of view. The
more developed countries have tended
to favor approaches allowing technologically advanced countries to derive the
principal benefits. The poorer countries
have either favored allowing the international community as a whole to manage
the process of exploiting ocean minerals
and other resources, thereby deriving
some of the revenue by having it divided
among all countries of the world, or
they have favored approaches allowing
the extension of territorial sovereignty
far to the seaward. This would give
governments, regardless of their level of
industrial development, much more of a
role in authorizing and hl'nefiting from
exploitation of offshore resources,
whether it he fishing resources or
mineral resources.
These kinds of conflicts wiII also be
reflected in increasing demands from
the African, Asian, and Latin American
states for revisions of the structure of
international trade and for what
amounts to a system of progressive
taxation in world society. Under such
an arrangement richer, high GNP countries will be expected, as a matter of
obligation rather than as a matter of
policy, to devote a fixed percentage of
their national income to alleviate
poverty and to facilitate economic
development in the poorer countries. In
this respect it is, I think, of some
significance that the Teheran Declaration of Human Rights in 196B, which is
the most recent statement of aspiration
in international affairs, imposes such an
obligation on richer, developing countries, and that the revised Charter of the
Organization of American States moves
strongly in the direl'tion of imposing
upon the United States an obligation to
provide a certain amount of money, free
from any control on the part of the

donor government, for the purposes of
developing the poorer countries.
These kinds of pressures for change
in the governing legal structure of the
world are quite predictable and, jn all
probability, could he handled reltSOnably successfully within the existing
structure of international society. What
is somewhat· doubtful is the ability of
the existing structure to cope with the
wider functional pressures that are
building up in international society,
pressures that continue to be only very
dimly appreciated at the present time.
In my judgment, these pressures arise
from interconnected and cumulative
threats that are beginning to imperil
human survival and even to endanger
the habitability of the planet as a whole.
If regarded in the most optimistic possible way, they are likely to produce a
steady deterioration in the quality of
national and international life unless
very meaningful responses occur very
shortly. i\lankind is confronted, for the
first time in human history, with a
world-order crisis of planetary dimensions. Our future depends, first of all,
on whether the governments of principal national societies are able to organize themselves to meet these new
kinds of problems.
The four interrelated and cumulative
threats are as follows: first, the continuing human tendency to resolve disputes among groups by recourse to
violence-and here [ mean to emphasize
the central importance of the persistence and pervasiveness of war as a
human institution for as far ahead as we
can see. There is nothing about the
structure of international law which
seems to offer any realistic prospect of
effectively moderating the role of war
except insofar as governments exercise
rational and prudent self-restraint in the
pursuit of their objectives and in the
interests of their own survival. The
second threat arises out of the growth
of world population at a very alarming
rate, both in terms of areas subjected to
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particular population pressures and in
relation to thc impact of the aggregate
world population upon the carrying
capacity of the earth's life support
systems. There is now a growing body
of evidence, for instance, Lhat when the
world population reaehes the threshold
of six or seven hillion, which it is
expected to do in the last decade of the
20th cenLury, there will be great pressure on existing oxygen supplies: some
marine biologists at the Univerf'ity of
California have estimated thaL the maximum oxygen-carrying capacity of the
world is 5.B billion. Whether they are
correct or not is not really my point.
My point is rather that the growing
expectation of greater population places
the whole basis of human exisLenee on
the world and national level in jeopardy.
The third threat seems to me to derive
from the prospect of shortages of critical, renewable, and nonrenewablc resources which will he bcginning to he
felt by the end of the century. This will
be accentuated to the extent that the
poorer countries arc successful in
achieving their goals of modernizing
their own society, that is, by achieving
industrial development of their own at a
rapid rate. And, of course, the rising
demands for production creatcd by an
increasing population-which seeks an
ever-higher "tandard of living-is the
dynamic underpinning of the dangers
that scem to me to derive from an
ever-growing spiral of demands upon a
fixed stock of resources. Fourth and
finally, the pressures of technology on a
scale more and more global in dimension arc causing a wide variety of
environmental problems of widening
scope. i\Iany of us arc familiar wiLh the
fact that large bodies of water such as
Lake Eric are virLually dead at Lhe
present Lime as a consequence of longsustained poll u tion-long-sustained
cUlllulative process of pollution that aL
no point was thought Lo imperil the
Great Lakes in the manner it now
obviously has imperiled them-a peril

Lhat turns out Lo 1)(' virtually irrever"ible
once certain threshholds of deterioration have been crossed. There is a
growing body of evidence which suggests that the same dangers arc mounting in reiaLion Lo the oceans of the
world; an ever-rising number of Lhe
mosL respeeLed oceanographers arc
warning about the danger of irreversible
catastrophes being caused by conLinuing
present raLes of poilu Lion of Lht' oe('anl'>.
And Lhis danger arises not only from
poilu Ling the oeeans so LhaL fish and
other living organisms :Ire put in jeopardy, but also by eontaminaLing Lhe
small marine micro-organisms underlying the whole process of phoLOsynthesis responsible for the producLion
of most of the world's oxygen supply.
There is already evidence, for insLanee,
Lhat the DDT eoneenLraLiom; in Lhe
ocean arc impeding photosynLhesis in a
way Lhat leads to decreases in the
production of oxygen.
These four kinds of threats seem verv
serious at the present time and wiil
become, almost assuredly, worse with
each passing year. The longer we def('r
any kind of acknowledgment of their
existence and their importance. the
more difficult it will he to take constructive and rectifying aetion in a
noncatastrophic way. A L thh:; point in
my prcsen tation, it lIIay app(~ar that my
remarks have little, or nOLhing aL all, to
do with international law.
International law is hound to he
influenced by the endangered planet
situation, in part because thc hasic lrgal
doctrine and political instit\ltion~ arc
incapable of coming to terms with these
emerging threats. The basic allocation of
legal authoriLy in world society is ba~ed
on two overriding principlcs. The firsL
principle is based on idcas of ownership
of real property-the principle that land
and water within land entrusts national
{!:overnments with virtually eX('lu:;iv()
authority to gOYl'rn their o'~n·t('rrit()ries
in accordance with their own policies.
The second principle is based on ideas
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of freedoJll-the principle of freedoJll of
the ocean!' and freedom of outer space
which e~sentially supposes that all beneficial uses may be made without the
need for a paLlern of common regulation since one is dealing with an arena
of such abundance that there is no need
to allocate authority among governments. Perhaps the simplest way to
dramatize the iII-suitedness of these two
principles is to borrow Garrett Hardin's
illustration of the historical experience
of overgrazing the English commons in
the 18th and 19th centuries.
In English country towns the pastureland was held in common among
the farmers who resided in the towns,
and they could graze their cattle as they
saw fit on thc common pasturcland. The
idca of a common pasture parallels the
idea of freedom of the ocean. In the
18th and 19th centuries, increases in the
animal population on these pastures
gradually came to place pressure on
their carrying capacity. A condition of
abundance was converted into one of
scarcity. Also, on the commons, private
ownership of the animals was combined
with public ownership of the grazing
land. The essenLial clement in what
Hardin calls the tragedy of the commons is a consequence of the combination of privatl~ and public ownership
becoming highly unstable and disruptive
in a situation of growing scarcity. Even
in conditions of scarcity each farmer
had a grcatcr incentive to increase the
size of his own herd rathcr than to
cxcrcise self-rcstraint to promote an
idea of limitation based on community
welfare-an aggregate figure for the
separate herds. I L is not surprising that
farmers continued to increase the size of
their herds and that English pasturcland
was eventually destroyed. The logic
leading up to this end is what has bcen
called the tragcdy of the commons: the
drive hy farJl1l)rs for maximum nwcnuc
hasl~d on maximum herds collided with
the public interest in maintaining
limited herds so that the pastureland

could sustain its aggregate animal population.
International society is entering into
a comparable phase in its development.
We are living now in the early years of
what 1 have labeled as the Ecological
Age. The Torrey Canyon oil spill can be
considered the Hiroshima of the Ecological Age and the Santa Barbara blowouts the Nagasaki. These occurrences
are the early warning signals, in effect,
of the impending inability of the permissive system by which the oceans arc
used to cope with the kinds of problems
being created by modern technology.
The Torrey Canyon incident was, in
part, caused by the desire to cut operating costs by registering an unseaworthy oil tanker in a state with liheral
registration standards. Such a substandard registry conflicted with the
public interest in maintaining the purity
of the oceans. Furthermore, in this
setting, the results were aggravated by
ecological ignorance-the oil pollution
really caused less damage than did the
efforts to disperse the oil through the
usc of chemical detergents. These detergents did a considerable amount of
seemingly permanenL damage to marine
life in the area most immediately affected.
The challenge is aggravated by the
fact that international socicly has experienced two major transformations in
a very shorL historical interval: Lhe first
transformation was brought about by
the development of nuclear weapons
and the initiation of the nuclear age,
which can be conveniently associated
with the Hiroshima atomic explosion in
1945. The second major transformation
can be associated with the year
1967-the time of the Torrey Canyon
disaster. Before 1945 international
society had several centuries to absorb
changes in technology, and even the
initiation of the nuclear age had been
preceded hy a eon!>ic.lerahle period of
warning of difficulties to come. World
War I and World War II provided strong
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indications of the destructiveness of
modern warfare and made many aware
that war was an expensive and often
self-destructive way of resolving ('t'ntral
conflicts in international society.
Therefore, if one looks at the long
sweep of international history, it becomes clear that .from the period of
1648 to 1914-from the Peace of Westphalia to the outbreak of World War
I-the period which the state system
emerged and developed, thert' was a
long buildup of attitudes and modes of
coordinating behavior which seemed to
correspond to the basic requirements of
a tolerable social and political existcnce.
And in that long prenuclear period, even
the institution of war was not, by and
large, an overly costly and destructive
way of resolving conflicts and providing
some method of change among contending political forces within international society.
The basic allocation of authority
between territorial sovereignty and freedom of use, community use, seemed to
work out quite well. Most events were
relatively local and could be territorially
confined. The oceans were sufficiently
ahundant to accommodate thc usc of
all. World War I underscored the dangers
of uncontrolled warfare as an instrument of national discrt'tion. The II~gal
efforts sinee World War I havt' hasically
been an allempt to both moderate and
prohibit the recourse to war under
conditions where it is increasingly
costly. As indicated at the outset, I am
very skeptical about the significance of
these legal efforts to eliminate war or
even to alter greatly the role of war in
international society.
The evolution of nuelear weapons
carried further the intensification of
weapons of destruction and made very
plain to all who were rational that
catastrophic consequences would follow
from lurge-scale nucIt'ar wurfare. In eOIltrust to the issues of the nucleur age, lhe
problems emerging in relution to the
Ecological Age are not yet understood

as presenting ha-·ie challenges to the
ways in which governments handle their
affairs and coordinate their activities.
The problem is, first of all, that the
oceans are insufficient to satisfy all
demands, that is, the tragt'dy of the
commons problem heing played out on
and beneath the high seas. There is also
the related problem of the nonlocalness
of domestic affairs as, increasingly,
evcnts and policies enacted with tcrritory have a bearing on the welfare of
the world. If we take at all seriously the
view, and I think we should, that the
world has a limited carrying capacity in
terms of world population, then what
different national governments do with
respect to population policy is very
important to the welfare of all our
national societies. I t is also of very great
importance what governments do amI
do not do on their territory with respect
to nuclear testing or contamination of
the atmosphere through radioactive explosions. The impacts of such a matler
are ohviously not confint'd to the territory of the state making the decision to
test these weapons, regardless of the
locus of the event.
One critical devt'lopment is that the
poorer parts of the world arc ht'coming
even more crowded. Most of these
int'reases in population have two eharact('ristics. First, they ,II'(: e()I1I!(~nlrated in
the poorer countries in Asia, Africa, und
Latin America; and second, these increases are concentrated in citics-most
of the net increase in world population
between now and the year 2000 will he
reflected in the growth of urban population. Cities in conditions of poverty are
the greatest source of world disease, and
there are growing dangcrs of epidemics.
Unsanitary urban conditions are likely
to hecome even more dangerous in t1w
decades ahead. We know that modern
medicine has practil'ully no deft'lise
against these outhreaks of contugious
disease. For instanc(', the Asian flu that
has swept around the world in recent
years has not been dangerous to very
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many people. I-1owewe'r, there is no
necessary n'ason, nH'dical or genetic,
why the flu has becn n'lalively henign in
the last few years. Epidemiologists predict that within the next few decades
there wiII be a lethal strain of virus that
wiII spread throughout the world. Many
of these developmcnts point in the same
direction, namely, that one can no
longer expect the welfare of any part of
the world to be upheld by even the
most enlightenl'd of national ~ove~rn·
ments. Imprudent governments may
endanger the welfarl' of mankind hy
acts undertaken within their territory.
The obsolescence of the state system
is obvious also in relation to the oceans.
One serious problem is the impact of
hard inseeticidcs on the quality of the
oceans. It is evident that national policy
and priorities hearing on choices such as
whether to make agricultural production more costly or less successful may
have a considerable ecological significam'e. Such choices hy principal governments might well determine whether the
ol'eans can sustain the delicate ecological halance. A decision reached by a
govrrnment as to whether or not to
prohibit DDT is not only of nationnl
significance hut, increasingly as well, of
world significance. Thus, in terms of
thinking about the capacity of the
international legal order to cope with
the problems of the future, we are
confronted with a very dangerous situation in which the basic attitudes of
self-reliance that have guided national
governments for several centuries seem
inadequate to cope with the emerging
problems of an endangered planet.
These basic attitudes have grown up in a
world situation in which separate states
were essentially meaningful units of
political Iife. In early times the ideals of
national sovereignty with respect to
national territory really did represent a
fairly rational allocation of governmental authority, and governments
could safeguard the welfare of their own
societies by adopting more or less

enlightenrd policies and by being vigilant about the protection of their independence and territorial integrity.
In the present se~lling then, if my
general interpretation is generally correct, no matter how enlightened national governments are with respect to
these four areas of threat, nothing these
governments do alone is capable of
assuring national welfare and of guaranteeing physical survival over any longterm period. Similarly, competition
among states using the oceans may
jeopardize common interests in maintaining and developing this extraordinary resource of mankind. A great deal
of evidence is beginning to he gathered
that demonstrates the limited ability of
present institutions to cope with the
kinds of problems that arc characteristic
of this early phase of the Ecological
Age.
The most dramatic inference from
my presentation is that a world of
sovereign statcs with traditions of competitive rivalry is doomed to cxtinction.
Such an inference may appear to he
simplistic or apocalyptic, but it is the
incvitahle outcome of the analysis. The
challenges of the Ecologienl Age mId up
to an adaptive challenge, which goes to
the roots of human existence. The social
and political institutions and supportive!
vnlues we have are not, at the present
time, eapahle of meeting this challenge.
At the present, our political agenda is
hadly outdated and obsolescent. Our
political agenda and, therefore, the
world-order prohlems that we try to
deal with have been exclusively defined
by the problems of man in society, of
men in different societies having different ends, human groups in collectivities
competing and conflicting with one
another, and, under certain circumstances of perceived interest, cooperating with one another. This political focus assumes that it is reasonable to
take for granted the environment within
which society and social and political
affairs are conducted. So long as the
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relations of men and nature can be
takcn for granted, it follows that human
society can expect to experience indefinite expansion. The whole commitment
to increasing the gross national product
at the national and world level every
year is an expression of belief in the
essential limitlessness of man's existence
on earth. The force of my argument is
that we nCl'd to plan the institutional
arrangements, the norms, and procedures for conducting human affairs
within a limited environment. We need
to accept, as best we can, the finiteness
of man as a creature of the world and
the finiteness of man's environment. A
recently published book, Agenda for the
Nation, published by the Brookings
Institution to guide the transition from
the Johnson administration to the
Nixon administration, illustrates how
out of step our most influential commentators are with this new order of
world problems. This book attempts to
cover all the issues that should he on the
agenda of the new administration. None
of the articles is devoted to any aspect
with which we have been concerned.
The ecological hazards are, in other
words, not part of the spretrum of
political relevance that is perceived by
our leading policymakers and decisionmakers. Part of this crisis of adaption is
revealed !ly a failure of awareness, a
failure reflected in the unwillingness to
create a new agenda of political action,
an agenda appropriate for an endangered planet.
In contrast to this sense of concern,
there are some hopeful signs. For instance, Presidcnt Nixon's address of
1%9 on population policy displayed an
unprecedented awareness of the political importance for the world and for the
United States of curtailing the continuing population expansion expected
by the end of the century. Patrick
[\Ioynihan in a sprech to the NATO
Council on 21 Octoher 1969 011 the
creation of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society acknowledged

the emerging ecological crisis as being
the overshadowing issue of our times.
Moynihan's specific assignment was to
make the case for widening the role of
NATO to include environmental prohlems. There is, thus, evidence that the
U.S. Government is becoming aware of
the importancl' of ccological challengl's
to national well-being. But it is essential
that a compar<lble awareness dev,·lop in
other major societies of the world. The
character of the problem is one that
requires a coordination of effort among
sovereign states. Such coordination can
only take place if a common sense of
the ecological crisis forms in different
parts of the world during the same
gcncral historical time. In this connection, one of the most important side
benefits of the Apollo mission has been
to present the world with visual images
of the unity of the earth and, therefore,
to foster recognition of the world as a
reality of its own. This presentation of
unity as the dominant image of global
rcality corresponds closely to the requirements for coordination of dfort
on a functional level. Unless political
perceptions begin to envision the world
in terms of its functional unity, in thc
same way that one sees the world from
outer space, the prospects of evolving
the kinds of approat:hes 11l'I'ded to lil'al
with these common problems facing
mankind seem virtually nil.
l'Vly own feeling about the present
situation is that the first urgent task
that follows from the acceptance of an
endangered planet argument is to revise
the political agenda by putting Lhis new
ecological category of problems into
sufficient focus so that governmcnt officials begin to understand thal their own
performance depends on developing responses to these challenges. In this vcin,
thl' most urgent tasks before international lawyers, in my judgment, are to
try to clarify the governing standards
and functional institutions that mighl
be appropriate for an endangered planet
and to direct an increasing amount of
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allcntion tc lrying to show, for instancc, that matters of world population
can no longer be entrusted exclusively
or indcfinitely to the relative degrce of
enli~htenment of diffl'rent national
(!;overnments. We nerd, instead, a COIllmon world policy renl'cling differt'nccs
in ideology, culture, religion, and ethical
values. And this common policy must
he evolved relatively rapidly for the
henefit of all mankind. The demonstration of these functional pressures will
itself help us to develop an awarene~s
which may arouse constructive responses and will help governments to
sec that an incrt'asing pcrcentage of the
rt'ally serious problems facing them cannot be dealt with by reliance in a
sovereignty-centered, competitive system of world society. We need to work
toward a much more cooperative set of
funeLional regimes-structures ahle to
work cooperatively and to dt'al witli
eommon interest:; in a wav which will
protect the interests of ali memhers of
the international community. Voluntary
action on behalf of the world interest is
not enough because of the contradictory tensions bt~twern egocentric and
community valucs-the tensions that
produce the tragedy of the commons. It
is not enough to point out that en-

lightenmcnt is necI'!'sary for all; different states have different interesLs and,
therefore, different sets of priorities. In
regard to these ecological problems. the
interests of the less devrloped countries
in maximizing development lead them
in a direction oppo!'ite to that Laken by
the more developed countriet" Lhat do
not have to operate under the same kind
of domestic pressure. Thus, one of the
most imporLant adjustments to the current inLernaLional setting would involve
the recognition that the real differences
in national priorities result from differences in national position, and that
differences need to be accommodatcd in
new legal doctrine that purports to work
for the I"ntire cOllllllnnity of staks, anti in
the design of institutions appropriatc to
dcal with these emerging ecological chalIcngcs.
The final point I wish to make is that
the traditional ideas of citizenship and
loyalty. need to bc reconsidered in light of
the imperatives of the Ecological Age. In
particular, we nced to make people more
sensitive to the increasing depl"ndcnce of
all peoples on the exercise of a certain
kind of global sanity. All society is now
so in tt!rdependen t that it is no longer
rationally possihle to contemplate going
it alone in the international system.
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